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a b s t r a c t
Using the categorisations which have helped to build the ﬁeld of
disability in France, this article analyses the meanings of disability
and how they shifted over the 20th century. Our aim is to identify,
from a holistic perspective, both the conditions under which they
wereproducedand themajorparadigms inwhich theywere rooted.
The initial category thus originates in the moral division of poverty
which was part of mediaeval Christianity and which, in the 14th
century, put forward inaptitude for work as a legitimate reason for
assistance. At the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th
century, solidarism and the principle of social debt opened the way
for redress for the damage caused by society: ﬁnancial redress to
begin with, then redress in the sense of “rehabilitation” within the
context of a war economy. Breaking down the boundaries of inap-
titude, these new procedures made a distinction between people
disabled through war or accidents at work – which came under the
heading of collective responsibility – and disabled civilians. Within
their groups, the latter therefore produced and distributed a new
meaning: disability “as an épreuve of the self”, a category of expe-
rience which was to ﬁnd support from various vulgates of human
and social sciences. However, the result was different acceptances
of the meaning of épreuve; although these had in common the fact
that they focused attention on the person, they were accompa-
nied by distinct modalities for the social treatment of disability.
 In the title of this article, the French expression “épreuve de soi” has been translated by “trial of the self”. However, in the
main body of the text the French term épreuve has been used, as this single word can have three different meanings which the
author wishes to conserve and there is no single word in English which captures all three meanings (Translator’s note).
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The vicissitudes of meanings of disability “as an épreuve” illustrate
the movement of reﬂexivity and subjectivity which drive our late
modernity and its effects on current social policies and practices.
© 2010 Published by Elsevier Masson SAS on behalf of
Association ALTER.
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r é s u m é
Partant de catégorisations qui ont participé à la constitution du
champ du handicap en France, l’article analyse les signiﬁcations de
cet objet et leurs déplacements au long du xxe siècle. L’entreprise
consiste à identiﬁer, dans une perspective holiste, tant les condi-
tions de leur production que les grands paradigmes dans lesquels
elles s’enracinent. Ainsi, la catégorie princeps procède d’une divi-
sionmorale de l’indigence qui s’inscrit dans la chrétientémédiévale
et pose, au xive siècle, l’inaptitude au travail comme cause légitime
de l’assistance. À la ﬁn du xixe et au début du xxe siècle, le sol-
idarisme et le principe de la dette sociale ouvrent la voie de
la « réparation » des dommages causés par la société : réparation
ﬁnancière d’abord, puis réparation au sens de « réadaptation » dans
le contexte de l’économie de guerre. Bousculant les frontières
de l’inaptitude, ces nouveaux dispositifs distinguent invalides de
guerre et du travail, relevant de la responsabilité collective, et
inﬁrmes civils. Ces derniers produisent et diffusent alors, au sein
de leurs collectifs, une nouvelle signiﬁcation : le handicap « comme
épreuve de soi », catégorie de l’expérience et du sujet qui trou-
vera un étayage dans différentes vulgates des sciences humaines et
sociales. Il en résultera, cependant, différentes acceptions du sens
de l’épreuve qui, si elles ont en commun de centrer l’attention sur
la personne, s’accompagnent de modalités distinctes de traitement
social du handicap. Les vicissitudes des signiﬁcations du handicap
« comme une épreuve » illustrent le mouvement de réﬂexivité et de
subjectivité qui anime notre modernité tardive et ses effets sur les
politiques et pratiques sociales actuelles.
© 2010 Publie´ par Elsevier Masson SAS pour l’Association ALTER.
Basing myself on work (by no means exhaustive) carried out on the categories which helped to
build the ﬁeld of disability, I try in this article to update the shifts in meaning of this “social object”
which havemarked the 20th century in France.My approach is a holistic one: themeanings are simply
a starting point which inevitably leads one to examine the actions of the actors involved within the
context of social policies andprocedures for the social treatment of inﬁrmity and,more broadly,within
the cognitive and moral contexts that deﬁne individuals in their relationships with the world. It is not
therefore a question of granting precedence to meanings or cognitions with regard to actions or social
institutions, and even less of trying to reduce one to the other, but rather to ask in what social world
individuals can form a given type ofmeaning and, conversely, whatmeaning relates back towhat type
of social relationships (Descombes, 2000).
Historically, the notion of disability is founded on the notion of being unﬁt for work. In an era
when work required all of one’s capacities and all of one’s physical energy, when it was synonymous
of pain and effort, any weakness, whatever its origin, meant one was unﬁt for work, which in turn
led to an exoneration from the obligation to work and at the same time to a moral and then legal
right to assistance. Beginning with the moral division of poverty which established legitimate rea-
sons for assistance (Castel, 2003; Stiker, 2000), I will describe the shifts in this initial meaning which
contributed towards the upheaval in the boundaries of inaptitude in parallel to the changes in forms
ok work, in the way it is organised and in the related values, and, more broadly, when entering “late
modernity” (Giddens, 1990).
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The ﬁrst of these shifts refutes the inevitable nature of inaptitude, by decreeing that disability is
a “recoverable”, “readaptable” situation which is compatible with certain forms of productivity. The
ﬁrst stage of the separation between inﬁrmity and the personwho is affected is reached. A second shift
leads to a change inwhat one looks at, from incapacity to people’s experiences, accepting disability “as
an épreuve” (Ville, 2008).Wewill nevertheless see that this épreuve can takedifferent forms, depending
on whether it is seen as an “épreuve of the self” or as an “épreuve for the self”. I will focus on describing
not only the material and contingent possibility conditions which caused these shifts in meaning to be
produced and the role of the different social actors who took part, but also the broader cognitive and
symbolic possibility conditions, i.e. the major paradigms in which these meanings manage to lodge
themselves in order to be in harmony with the “climate of ideas” (Douglas, 1986).
Following the vicissitudes of the meaning of disability “as an épreuve” throughout the 20th century
is an enlightening undertaking, above and beyond the ﬁeld in question, in as much as it shows the
movement of reﬂexivity and subjectivity, which animates our late modernity. Illness and disability
seem to have become examples of howone constitutes oneself as a subject in the épreuve, an épreuve of
destiny, transposable to épreuves of another nature, which are the consequences of structural changes.
Contemporary interest in the capacity of individuals to forge themselves through épreuves seems as
though it must be related to social transformations which have signiﬁcantly eroded collective protec-
tion devices (Castel, 2003), leading to new experiences such as lack of job security, unemployment,
academic failure, etc.
Inﬁrmity, a legitimate cause for assistance
The association of inﬁrmity with inaptitude for work was objectivised at the end of the Middle
Ages by the separation of poor people into those who were eligible for the ﬁrst devices of assistance
and those who were not (Castel, 2003; Stiker, 2000). Those who could not accomplish the laborious
tasks required to subsist, due to their physical weakness,1 deserved help, unlike those who were fully
strong enough to work.
The real challenge of this categorisation was to put an end to the high level of mobility of the
poor, which was threatening the feudal system, by forcing them to remain where they were.2 It was
above all a question of enforcing their obligation to remain in their places of origin, as an unavoidable
condition for people with no possessions. Thus, began a lengthy process, backed by social procedures
which were to lead, on the one hand, to the generalisation and specialisation of the system of social
assistance, with a huge increase in the number of leper-houses and hospital-houses, and, on the other
hand, to the repression of begging and vagrancy (Castel, 2003).
The distinction between the “deserving poor” and “vagrants”, thus, came to be used as a response
to a crisis situation, with periods of social unrest and instability forcing the “provocation of sense”
(Zariﬁan, 2003). Yet, the determination of monarchic power to put an end to mobility was not enough
to establish the two categories. Indeed, the separating line was not based on any ontological char-
acteristic of poor people. If one is to organise the principle of assistance, in order to deﬁne eligible
populations, one must deﬁne the criteria which legitimise the help and these criteria are not provided
by the situation itself. The reasons for these criteria are to be found elsewhere, in a vision of a shared
world into which the new problem must be integrated in order to become socially signiﬁcant. For all
new categories are preceded by a theoretical system which orientates selection of the properties of
similitude or resemblance of the objects or phenomena that one wishes to bring together (Douglas,
1986).
The rules of mediaeval Christianity provided the cognitive support to which the new categories
could be attached. In the Middle Ages, the economy of salvation governed relations between the rich
1 Indeed, inaptitude for work exceeded its current medical acceptance requirements, to include social situations where
“natural” physical weakness was no longer compensated for by the community (orphaned children, widows, the elderly, etc.).
2 Between 1347 and 1348, the Black Death killed one third of the population of Europe, and poor people in particular. The
penury of manual labour which ensued encouraged the peasants to demand higher wages, and if this was refused, to leave their
home regions to offer their services elsewhere. The result was a mobile workforce which threatened the traditional ways that
work was organised.
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and the poor; works of misericord, a means whereby one could pay for one’s sins, needed poor people
to exist in order to function (Mollat, 1978). In parallel to the performance of charity, the authori-
ties reasserted another secular law which linked idleness to evil.3 Taken together, these two rules
strengthened the legitimacy of the categorisation of the poor, onto which were built devices for their
differential treatment. The latter were reinforced by symbolic procedures with, on the one hand, the
representation of the suffering body in the iconography and hagiography of the saints, the degener-
ation of bodies illustrating the sufferance caused by poverty (Castel, 2003; Stiker, 2000) and, on the
other hand, the stigmatisation of the vagrant, who chooses to live in sin rather than earn an honest
living and who ﬁnds himself to be considered as a criminal.4
This ﬁrst categorisation made inaptitude for work an inescapably legitimate cause of assistance,
removing the obligation to work. As a response to the mobility of the poor, it essentially targeted
people considered to be “ﬁt forwork”, whowere excluded from the sphere of assistance. In its primary
intention, the change caused by the categorisation was not designed to beneﬁt the inﬁrm. Yet, its side
effect was to deﬁne the new scope of assistance, which, as it became more generalised, also created
an increasingly speciﬁc domain, combined with care procedures which continued to develop and
diversify. Establishments were devoted to the sick and inﬁrm – establishments such as the Hôtels-
dieu, or the Hôpital des incurables in Paris, which took care of the lame, the one-armed or armless
and the dropsical (Stiker, 2000), or the Hôpital des Quinze-Vingts which cared for the blind; other
institutions were created for other categories of people, such as the Hôtel des invalides which was
open to disabled soldiers. Exoneration from work was to last over the centuries, up until changes in
forms of work linked to a poor economic climate caused the system to be called into question.5
Rehabilitation and solidarity
A shift in the meaning of disability, linked to inaptitude to work, was born of the conjunction of
a new paradigm, solidarism, and a crisis situation, the First World War. Solidarism, which came into
place during the Third Republic (1871-1940), is based on the dual principle of “social debt”, according
to which people are indebted to society for the forms of solidarity which were there before them, and
for the necessity of a “reparatory justice” designed to correct the wrongdoings that society inﬂicts
upon its members6 (Blais, 2007).
The French law of the 9thApril 1898 on accidents at work was a direct result of this. It introduced
the notion of responsibility “for risk”, without there necessarily being any fault, and brings out the
idea of social redress for the damage done. The invalidity which results from the accident refers to the
loss of the capacity to work. It is seen as the product of a collective activity and must be dealt with by
the community (Ewald, 1986). Henceforth, the inability to work due to an accident which occurred at
work was removed from the domain of charitable assistance and placed in the domain of social law,
where insurance is a privileged tool (Winance et al., 2007).
A few years later, the “Great War” was to cause immeasurable damage, in terms of the number
of mutilations it produced. Within the context of reparatory justice, war injuries gave one the right
to a military disability pension, guaranteed by the government. But the particular situation of a war
economy for which all of the forces of the nation had to be mobilised caused the area of redress to be
broadened, to gobeyondmereﬁnancial compensation fordisability. Thiswas thebirthof rehabilitation
as a new form of social intervention, combined with a moral sense of responsibility, or even guilt, for
3 Idle hands are the devil’s workshop.
4 As demonstrated by this royal decree of 1350: “And because several able-bodied beggars, as long as they can live off alms,
refuse to work, spending their time at leisure and sinning and sometimes also stealing and at other bad actions, we hereby
order upon pain of imprisonment that no man must offer succour, on the pretext of piety or alms-giving, or maintain in idleness
those who are capable of useful work. In this way they will be obliged to work to earn their living [. . .]” (Geremek, 1980, p. 72).
5 In certain places, the inﬁrm – just like the poor who were locked up in general hospitals – were nevertheless put to work.
This was the case, for example, for the wounded soldiers in the Hôtel des invalides (Stiker, 2000).
6 “There is a right which stems from the very violation of the law, that of redress. There is always a certain amount of general
injustice which is not the fault of any speciﬁc person, but of society as a whole and which is often a legacy of the past. Whence
the need for reparatory justice” (Fouillée, 1880, quoted in Blais, 2007, p. 31).
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the damage incurred. It became a question not just of replacing with a prosthesis, but of re-placing,
of putting people back into their prior conditions (Stiker, 2000). In response to a dire lack of manual
labour, the ideawas also to enable disabled soldiers to return towork, by rehabilitating them, using the
complementary nature of different techniques applied in speciﬁc places. Professional rehabilitation
schools and centres were created under the aegis of the Ofﬁce national des mutilés et réformés7
created in 1916. A legislative device governed these new practices; in addition to rights to ﬁnancial
compensation, it introduced jobs which were reserved for disabled servicemen, and a compulsory
number of disabled persons that companies must employ. These measures were rapidly extended to
victims of accidents atwork. The latter, brought together in a powerful federation – the Fédération des
mutilés du travail8 – used what had already been achieved by disabled servicemen as a trampoline
to establish their own claims, not hesitating to liken an accident at work to a sacriﬁce for the nation,
just like being wounded at war (de Blic, 2008). Rehabilitation thus inaugurated the end of exoneration
of disabled persons from work, as it in fact attempts to help them get back to work. “Solidarity, the
situation of the jobmarket and pressure fromwar veterans and their organisations combined to create
this shift from assistance to reinsertion” (Romien, 2005).
But the universality of the principle is one thing (potentially applicable to any inﬁrmity, whatever
its origin); yet, another is the designation of those who will have access to its implementation. A new
type of differentiation arose, which had its cognitive grounding in the paradigm of social debt and
reparatory justice. Different categories of disabled persons were thus identiﬁed, according to whether
or not social responsibility was engaged, i.e. according to the circumstances in which the disability
occurred: a collective activity, such as national defence or production, or another situation which did
not involve any service to the nation. Only the former were considered to beneﬁt from a collective
debt towards them. So-called disabled “civilians”, thosewho suffered from the after-effects of illnesses
(tuberculosis, polio, etc.), who had congenital problems or who were victims of accidents at home,
did not beneﬁt from this area of intervention. The circumstances, of war or work, under which the
injuries occurredwere thus of vital importance; theywere both purveyors ofmeaning andof resources
(compensation, redress) in response to debt; they determined the status of the people concerned. The
disabled “civilians” were only civilians by default. They could not expect the origin of their disability
to give any meaning to their history, because they were simply victims of nature and chance. In the
absence of any legitimate cause, their situation could not be resolved under the social laws of the time.
In the eyes of certain people affected by illness, this situation quickly became intolerable. As André
Dessertine (2001, p. 15)9 says: “it has to be said that the measures taken to help the reinsertion of
disabled war victims were of a nature that aroused envy in disabled civilians”. This was the start
of a huge associative movement10 which began life in the 1920s. These associations for sick and
disabled civilians were initially created on a very local scale, but they soon grew considerably in size,
attracting numerous members and often winning the support of well-known public personalities. The
effectiveness and the propagation of these associations were such that they played a vital role in the
French public policies which marked the 20th century (Barral, 2007).
Disability “as an épreuve”
Differential treatment, depending on how the disability occurred, acted as a catalyst, provoking
a new shift in the meaning of disability. Obtaining recognition equivalent to that given to disabled
veterans and victims of accidents at work meant getting past the categorisation based on the origins
of the impairments and gaining acceptance for a broader perspective regarding disabled persons, one
7 French national ofﬁce for disabled and reformed servicemen.
8 French federation of victims of accidents at work. This federation was created in 1921 and still defends the interests and
rights of its members, gradually expanding to include disabled civilians. It became the “Fédération nationale des accidentés du
travail”, before being renamed “Association des accidentés de la vie” in 2003.
9 President of the Association d’entraide des polios et handicapés from 1957 to 2007.
10 The ﬁrst association came into being at the end of the 1920’s, in a centre for people suffering from tuberculosis, and later
became the Ligue pour l’adaptation du diminué physique au travail (currently L’ADAPT); another association was created in a
physiotherapy centre in Lausanne, later becoming the “Association des paralysés de France” (APF).
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which made sense for everyone. Whilst they were introducing procedures which would compensate
for their exclusion from social law,11 the ﬁrst groups of disabled civilians put forward a new meaning
for disabilitywhich shifted attention from the collective situation of the occurrence of the impairment
to the experience of the impairment itself. Such a meaning introduced the entrance to the person as a
“subject” into the realm of public debate. Indeed, no attention to the “subject” appeared in the social
treatment of disabledwar veterans. Itwas on a collective basis that the servicemenhad fought for their
country and it was also on a collective (and sometimes anonymous) basis that they were gloriﬁed for
the sacriﬁces they had made. Similarly, the strategy adopted by the Fédération de mutilés du travail to
demonstrate an equivalence between situations of war and of work highlighted the sacriﬁcial aspect
of accidents relating to the collective work of production (de Blic, 2008). Its success, in likening work
disability to war disability when it came to access to rehabilitation, did not make people want to
question this categorisationofdisability in termsof theoriginof the impairment.On theotherhand, the
lack of any system of reference for “civil” disability, which thus found itself excluded from procedures
of recognition and treatment, caused a newmeaning of disability to be produced, by rebound. Thiswas
something which had until then been totally ignored: individual experience, which included modes
of expression which had in common the fact of contributing towards people’s identities, their values,
their attitude towards existence and the quality of their relationships with others.
Independently of its cause or of how it occurred, disability became an épreuve which could be
worked on in a reﬂexive manner; something from which one could learn lessons, learn about oneself,
about the values of existence, and out of which one emerged a better person. In other words, disability
was conceived as constituting the person, i.e. as an experience through which the self tests itself,
develops and changes. This is what I mean when I refer to “épreuve of the self”.
The notion of épreuve does indeed appear to be heuristic due to its interesting polysemy which
designates not just the facts of the individual experience, but also the structural aspects which mould
it.
At a subjective level,more often thannot, the épreuve relates to an experience one has had, a painful
experience which is sometimes combined with secondary moral or psychological qualities. But in the
factitive sense, putting someone on épreuve is to put someone to the test. The épreuve is thus controlled
by someone other than the subject him/herself. It is a case of establishing, verifying and proving the
qualities of that which is being tested, be it a person or an object. It seems to me that the conjunction
of these two meanings precisely reﬂects the meanings of disability in the sociopolitical context of the
welfare state and rehabilitation practices. Indeed,whilst disabilitymight be considered to be a random
event which occurs outside the social structure,12 the ensuing experience is nevertheless dealt with
by social institutions in a normalising épreuve. The result is thus a binary one – one either succeeds or
fails in “overcoming” the épreuve. Yet, in the artistic world, and in that of engraving or photography
in particular, the notion of épreuve13 also relates to another type of result of the experience, that
of a production which can be retouched or revised. It seems to me that this third approach, which
goes beyond the dualism of success or failure to make the épreuve the product of work, perfectly
reﬂects the reﬂexivity at work in late modernity. And it is this third meaning which is expressed in
the precursory accounts of the pioneers of the associative movement and which is taken up, some
50years later, in the widespread disabled persons movement. Speaking of his stay at the tuberculosis
centre at Berck-sur-Mer, Robert Buron14 thus wrote:
“It was then, when I entered the ‘realm of the bedridden’ at the age of 18 [in 1928] that I accessed
a form of reﬂexive awareness which allowed me to fully savour the taste of life, to wake up to myself.
At Berck, I ﬁrst of all discovered myself, then the others, and above all, the fact that the inevitable
individualisation of the affective domainwas simply the counterpart that one can andmust experience
for everyone, in other words, one’s fellow man in general” (quoted by Savy, 2003, p. 16).
Other examples can be found, especially in psychosociological works dealing with the issue of
disability. In Stigma for example, Goffman quotes a disabled person: “But now, far away from the
11 The ﬁrst associations for disabled persons set up the institutions which ensured their own rehabilitation.
12 Which is itself debatable, as everyoneknows that theseexperiencesareunevenlydistributed,dependingonsocial categories.
13 In the sense of a proof.
14 One of the founders of L’ADAPT, who was on several occasions to become a Minister under the 4th and 5th republics.
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hospital experience, I can evaluatewhat I have learned. For itwasn’t only suffering, itwas also learning
through suffering. I know my awareness of people has deepened and increased, that those who are
close to me can count on me to turn all my mind and heart and attention to their problems.” (Goffman,
1963, p. 11).
This sense of épreuve is also perceptible in the editorial of the ﬁrst issue of “Faire Face”, the journal
of the Association des paralysés de France, which came out in 1933. It reads: “We want to be men in
the full and sublime sense of the word, despite – or thanks to? – our physical inferiority; men who
have understood the meaning and the value of life, despite – or thanks to? – our suffering”.
The meaning of disability “as épreuve of the self” designates this type of expression which, above
and beyond the difﬁculties which have to be faced, combines reﬂexivity – what people learn about
their situations, the new values and conceptions that they develop – and inter-subjectivity – the
depth of exchanges, the extent to which people listen to one another and share with others, these
two aspects appearing to be inseparable.15 As we have seen, one of the conditions of this meaning
of disability’s emergence results from the differential treatment of the various categories of disabled
persons and from the feeling of inequity which this causes. But such a meaning relating to the private
sphere can only assert itself in public debate if people work on it collectively, which means that
people need to meet and exchange views. We can only move towards generalisation by examining
empirical cases, by comparing individual experiences and looking for similarities and invariables.
In return, one of the effects of this process is to favour the occurrence of similar cases, by offering a
signiﬁcant resourcewhichallowsotherpeople toanalyse their experience fromadifferentperspective.
This second condition is achieved through disabled persons being gathered together in physiotherapy
centres and sanatoria, thus allowing thepioneers,within their groups, to invent, validate anddistribute
a meaning of disability as an “épreuve of the self”.
In order to be shared, a new meaning must ﬁnd an anchor point within an overall system and
be in harmony with the “climate of ideas” (Douglas, 1986). Whilst the categories of the poor found
legitimacy in mediaeval Christianity, and the categories of disabled war veterans and people injured
at work found theirs in solidarism, disability “as an épreuve” – the subjective category of experience –
found support in the different vulgates of human and social sciences: the theory of the personality, the
theory of stigma and the theory of experience (biographical or narrative). Depending on the theories
in which it found support, acceptance of the épreuve would differ, with the accent being placed either
on people’s ability to face up to the épreuve (an épreuve for a self which precedes it), or on the trial
of people by social institutions (the factitive sense of épreuve). It was not until much later, with the
move into late modernity,16 that the third sense of épreuve, as being constitutive of the self, was able
to become the base for collective identities, a true political lever with which to back claims. Only then
did this new meaning ﬁnally reveal itself to social science researchers as being able to integrate a
general system of how mankind and society function, to the point where the researchers themselves
would be the relay for its distribution and penetration into the public arena.
The deviation of the sense of the épreuve or the psychologisation of disability
For half a century, the meaning of disability as an épreuve of the self was to remain within associ-
ations, where it was probably a useful tool for the members. Public debate, essentially in the domain
of social action and rehabilitation, preferred to give it the psychological meaning of an épreuve, which
was better suited to the desire for normalisation. The épreuve was thus imposed from the outside and
had to be overcome through effort. It was a sort of épreuve for the self, a preexisting self who may
15 Still today, the intersubjective aspect is very much present in the biographical accounts of disabled persons, the new values
and perspectives on life which emerge from their experiences being very frequently linked to meetings with their peers in
centres, associations, etc. (see among others: Ville, 2005; Gill, 1997; Marcellini, 2005).
16 I useAnthonyGiddens’ term.According tohim, there is nopost-modernity, but insteada radicalisationandauniversalisation
of the consequences of modernity and of reﬂexivity in particular. “The reﬂexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that
social practices are constantly examined and reform in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus
constitutively altering their character. We shoul be clear about the nature of this phenomenon. All forms of social life are partly
constituted by actor’s knowledge of them”. (Giddens, 1990 p. 38).
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or may not be capable of meeting the challenge. It was deﬁned as the pathway which allowed one to
access a common normality, at the heart of which was work.
It has to be said that with the arrival of the social state and the generalisation of full-time salaried
employment, along with a certain number of social protections and rights, work gradually became
a highly valorised activity, at least until the beginning of the 1980s. For the ﬁrst groups of “disabled
civilians”, it essentially meant ﬁnancial independence, the possibility of escaping assistance, which
more often than not,meant nomore than a room in a special asylum. However, over time, thematerial
functions ofworkwere supplementedwithmoral and psychological values. By conferring a sentiment
of recognition and utility, professional activity became the main source of personal achievement. The
normalisation of disabled persons went hand in hand with an increased valorisation of the moral
and psychological aspects of work. What was beneﬁcial for the average man in the street would
be even more so for the disabled (Ville, 2005). Overall, up until the 1980s, the different actors in
the ﬁeld of disability shared the same point of view with regard to the virtues of working and of
professional insertion; as Franc¸ois Bloch-Lainé says in the report which initiated preparation of the
1975 guidance law in favour of disabled persons: “it has been established that work is the essential
element in adaptation to society. A disabled person who has not been able to ﬁnd work or to return to
work remains “cut off”, even if he/she manages to provide for him/herself and his/her family through
pensions or allowances. Rejected by the community, he/she ends up considering him/herself as an
outcast, for whom fate has deﬁnitively removed the possibilities for personal achievement available
to normal workers” (Rapport Bloch-Lainé, 1969, Appendix B: 5). Associative representatives share
the same view: it is through work that invalids can prove their value and recover their dignity. This
discourse is accompanied by a requirement of success or even excellence, designed to counter the
unwillingness of employers to take on disabled workers. This requirement is “present in the spirit of
the majority of senior members in the movement. [. . .] Disabled persons, be they young or old, when
studying or working, must force themselves not just to be as good as able-bodied persons, but better
than them” (Breen, 2003, p. 141). The challenge goes beyond ﬁnancial independence; it is a question
of becoming part of “average normality” and in order to “be like everyone else”, of doing “more than
them”. Indeed, the path to normalisation is built around the moral qualities of impaired persons
who, above and beyond instilling a know-how instil a “know-how- to-be” disabled. (Ebersold, 1992;
Ville et al., 1994). Right through to the debates surrounding the preparation of the law, the courage
and perseverance of disabled persons are brought to the fore, as qualities which have value in the
workplace.
As it would appear to be accepted that disability is an épreuve, it is therefore less a question of
constructing oneself through disability than of facing up to it and overcoming it by deploying the
required psychological qualities. There is a shift. From an “épreuve of the self” which can be worked
on and which allows one to test oneself, it becomes an “épreuve for the self” which is inseparable
from the épreuve of the body.17 A strong and determined psychological constitution allows access to a
“normal life” – in particular, by working and founding a family (Ravaud and Ville, 1985). The response
to the épreuve is binary: either one overcomes the disability or one does not. This leads to a new
categorisation which divides disabled persons into victims or heroes - “heroes of adjustment” said
Goffman, living models for the conquest of normality.
Social sciences and the meaning of épreuve
The conception of disability as an “épreuve of the self”, put forward at the end of the 1920s by the
ﬁrst groups of French disabled persons, did not ﬁnd any theoretical anchor point in the ﬁeld of social
sciences. After the period of major effervescence in the ﬁeld of ideas, between the two wars, which
sawhuman and social sciences deploy in different directions, there came the long coldwinter of objec-
17 This sense of épreuve, which was to dominate political, professional and scientiﬁc discourse for a long time, was shared by
disabled persons themselves when they became inﬂuential representatives in public debate. In 1981, Suzanne Fouché wrote:
“It is on what is left intact inside them and on the new values born of their resistance to illness, that the physically impaired
must build their lives.” (Fouché, 1981, p.150).
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tivism (Bruner, 1990)18, based on the principle of the existence of a truth, of a “just” explanation for
the social phenomena which force themselves upon actors from the outside and which it is science’s
responsibility to explain. The theories which were then developed, both in the ﬁeld of social cognition
and in that of symbolic interactionism, were unable to integrate the sense of épreuve as being consti-
tutive of the self. The two currents interpreted itsmanifestations as “bias” (bias of cognitive reasoning,
bias in the situation of interaction) or as illusions.
In the ﬁeld of social cognition, disability was seen as an épreuve in as much as it threatened self-
esteem. Researchers focused on the strategies and resources used to accept illness or disability and
to ﬁnd the self-esteem which had supposedly been lost. They spoke of “coping” which was based on
“the ability to create and maintain a series of illusions” (Taylor, 1983, p.1161), and adaptive ability of
normal cognitive functioning. The resulting “negotiation of reality” (Elliott et al., 1991; Snyder, 1989)
reveals an intrapsychicmechanismwhich consists in advantageouslymaking up the reality, distorting
it in some way, without there being any action taken to change it.19 In this perspective, any account
valorising the experience of a disability relates to an adaptivemechanism. Indeed, the self does not test
itself during the experience, but obeys a need, a necessity. It does not produce meaning, but protects
itself against a threat. The latter is taken for granted, without the social meaning of what constitutes
it or the sociohistorical conditions which allow (or not) negotiation being called into question.
From the interactionist perspective, the épreuve of disability is not internalised but, on the con-
trary, arises during interaction, because there is no “inner me” who would be irreducible to its social
constructionanddistinct fromthe social roles it has shouldered.Goffman’swork (1963) on thedisqual-
iﬁcation relating to stigma is exemplary in this respect. The presence of a stigma generates uncertainty
that the actors will try to resolve by acting “as if” there were no stigma. Affected persons attempt to
hide the stigma, in order to take on the appearance of a normal person, whilst the people with whom
they are in contact pretend they cannot see it. At the same time, as giving the impression that the
interaction is following a normal course, this strategy of “pretence” produces an absolute difference
which relates not to the objectivity of the stigma but to the irreducible distance that it imposes upon
the relationship. Goffman calls this “phantom normalcy”. Because here it is indeed the normalcy of
the interaction which is illusory and not the interpretation of the situation. The consequence of biased
interactions is to “spoil” the identity of the person with the stigma. Goffman conceives identity more
as a group of interiorised social roles than as the fruit of a reﬂexive activity. And as these roles are
imposed upon the actors, the moral itineraries taken by stigmatised persons are not seen as alter-
native and innovative pathways, but as the consequence of biased interactions. This is why Goffman
describes the expression of disability as an “épreuve of the self” which he quotes in Stigma (see above),
as “blessing in disguise”. His interpretation does not designate a production of sense of self in situation
but rather ways of coming to an arrangement with the situations for which the script has already been
written.
Disability as an experience during which the self tests itself and transforms itself, as expressed by
the pioneers of French disability movements at the end of the 1920s, is thus an illusion for cognitive
psychology and symbolic interactionism,20 demonstrating a denial of reality or resulting from biased
social interactions, allowing one to “face up” to – or to “save face” – in a situation which by its very
essence is negative. The épreuve resides in the effort required to cope with the negative consequences
of disability, so as not to sink into depression or deviancy. This effort is never enough to reduce the
intrinsically negative21 meaning of the situation which is given as being objectively “true”.
It is, nevertheless, important to put the expressions of the “disabled self” back into their historical
context in relation to the institutions which govern disability. Indeed, these expressions – which Goff-
18 It should be noted that the individual psychology of Alfred Adler and in particular his theory of compensation which he
put forward in the 1920’s and which was a major inspiration for the Russian psychologist Vygotsky, was perfectly capable of
serving as an anchor for a dynamic meaning of the épreuve.
19 In this sense, the deﬁnition of negotiation is very different from that suggested by Strauss, 1978.
20 Yet, in Mirrors and masks, whilst Strauss (1959) does not make any allusion to the experience of illness and disability, he
opens the path to a conception of identity forged in the trials of life, “critical periods” which, whilst appearing to be “personal
matters”, are nevertheless socially structured. (Strauss, 1959).
21 For Goffman, stigma as a relationship is intrinsically negative, because the resulting relational distance is irreducible.
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man analyses with considerable ﬁnesse in Stigma – must be brought together with the then dominant
paradigmofwhatonemight call “averagenormality”, characterisedbya strongpressure tomovecloser
to the majority, to melt into the standards of the masses. This was a period when institutions were
strong, when ordinary conducts were regulated, when a large number of distinctive characteristics,
such as homosexuality, single parenthood, impairment, etc., were likely to cause discredit and were
thus kept secret.22 Within such a context, the notion of stigma takes on its fullest meaning. In the soci-
ety that Goffman describes, it is supposed that “whether or not they have an attribute which causes
discredit, individuals share the same aspiration for normality (Calvez, 2004, p. 61). Rehabilitation
practices exempliﬁed, exacerbated even, the paradigm of “average normality”. All efforts converged
in order for disabled persons to share the common lot, whatever the price that had to be paid (Ville et
al., 1994).
Butwhat happens if the paradigm of average normality is called into question, as other alternatives
present themselves, if the pressure is not so much “to be like everyone else” but “to be oneself”, to
build an individual life pathway? The notion of stigma then loses its heuristic value, with any speciﬁc
attribute, whatever it may be, having the potential to be valorized or at least to be singularly ﬂexible
in the enterprise of producing a sense of self.
The reﬂexive work of the épreuve: a means of emancipation
With entry into late modernity, several social science orientations converged to place épreuves of
life and the ruptures that they impose at the heart of sociological analysis. Without any attempt to
being exhaustive, we can mention, in this respect, a certain sociology of experience, the narrative
movement and biographical approaches. . . They have in common that they place the focus on the
reﬂexive work of social actors.
With the decline of the institutionalised programme which socialised actors by interiorising the
norms and principles common to individuals and to the system (Dubet, 2002), the sense of self and of
one’s historywasno longer given, but had to be built via the épreuves encountered along life’s pathway.
“Social roles and positions are no longer enough to deﬁne the stable elements of action, because
individuals no longer complete a programme, but attempt to build unity using diverse elements from
their social lives and from the many orientations that they carry within themselves. Social identity is
therefore not a “being” but a “work” (Dubet, 1994, p. 16). Such an observation invites some theorists to
develop a sociology of experience in which the issues of the subjects – actors in their own biographies,
who negotiate their places and build their identities – have supplanted institutional analyses and the
revelation of their structural effects. When analysing social issues we need to refer more to individual
histories than to sociology (Rosanvallon, 2000).
For the narrative movement, which was essentially developed in the United States, through the
meaning that it produces, the act of narration makes it possible to objectivise social facts. It is based
upon the intersubjectivity of experiences and actions and is limited by the language and systems of
culturally shared meanings. Narrative becomes the material par excellence which makes it possible to
highlight the reﬂexivity of social actors. This perspective opens the way for a diachronic conception
of self, characterised by plot-building, which is incessantly revised over the ﬂow of life’s épreuves and
situations. A new conception of self as a narrative construction thus comes into being as an alternative
to the traditional conception of a natural self with its own existence (Bruner, 1990; Freeman, 1993;
Somers, 1994; Vollmer, 2005). Different versions share the common idea that sense of self and sense of
the situations in which it takes form are jointly built during the narrative activity, which draws on our
reserve of common meanings. We attempt to give unity to our life pathway, continuously revising the
plot in order to incorporate new events or new épreuves. Built in this way, the self is a conﬁguration
of personal events within a historical unity that includes what one has been and anticipation about
22 Indeed, Goffman talks about the situated nature of the reference to normality. “The notion of ‘normal human being’ may
have its source in the medical approach to humanity or in the tendency of large-scale bureaucratic organizations, such as the
nation state, to treat all members in some respect as equal. Whatever its origins, it seems to provide the basic imagery through
which laymen currently conceive of themselves” (Goffman, 1963 p. 7).
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what one will be (Polkinghorne, 1988; Ricœur, 1990). From this perspective, the function is to build a
life history which suits one’s present condition.
These movements had applications in the sociology of health, based on the analysis of accounts of
experiencesof illness anddisability. Psychologists and sociologists thus “discovered” that in favourable
caseswhere there are resources, the experienceof illness anddisabilitymaybe linked to theexpression
of positive feelings, of a good quality of life and/or of a valorized self.23 When people commit them-
selves to biographical work, it allows them to “transcend their losses, resolve their feelings about
them, and emerge with a stronger more valued self” (Charmaz, 1999, p. 72). Many new concepts have
sprungup to illustrate this phenomenon,which is disrupting traditional negative representations such
as that of the “disability paradox” (Albrecht andDevlieger, 1999), of “transcendence” (Charmaz, 1999),
of “resilience” (Cyrulnik, 2000), or of “epiphany” (Denzin, 1989).
In the meantime, the disability studies, which based themselves on the mobilisation of disabled
persons that grew in strength at the end of the 1970s in the United Kingdom, the USA and Scandi-
navian countries (Anspach, 1979), offered new reading grids for the experience of disability, which
whilst countering traditional negative meanings, and committed themselves to “reverse” the épreuve
to make it a support for a positive identity, thus achieving individual emancipation through collective
subjectivation. “To claim ‘I amdisabled’ is a political statement. It is to align oneselfwith other disabled
people in a struggle for equality, inclusion and full citizenship” (Branﬁeld, 1999, p. 399).
In the new intellectual context of the 1980s, the meaning of disability as “épreuve of the self”,
proposed at the end of the 1920s by the ﬁrst groups of French disabled persons, was ﬁnally able to
ﬁnd a strong theoretical anchor point. Its deployment and publicisation were such that it managed
to become established in social policies and practices of assistance, in the form of a biographical
imperative (Astier and Duvoux, 2006).
Constructing oneself through épreuve: emancipation or obligation?
Over recent years, especially in the ﬁeld of social action, we have observed the phenomenon
of public authorities “capturing subjectivity” (Zariﬁan, 2004), characterised by repeated dictates to
“be oneself”, to project oneself, to construct a coherent and socially acceptable life (Franssen, 2006;
Cantelli and Genard, 2007). The notion of a “life-project” is indeed written into the French law of
the 11th February2005, known as “The law on the equal rights and opportunities, participation and
citizenship of disabled persons”.
Are the phenomena of “reversing the épreuve”24 not in the process of themselves performing a
reversal in order to create the current mode of heroisation, symbol of a new form of achieved normal-
isation, no longer focused on alignment with the behaviours of the average person (as is the case with
rehabilitation), but on the capacity to produce one’s own norms and values (Winance, 2004)? From
equality between individuals, characterised by everyone having access to the same ideals, which con-
tributed towards an identity in the sense of a similitude between individuals, or towards an “average
normality”, we have moved to the equality of opportunity, or to the equal possibility of being unique,
of achieving one’s own objectives, of making something of one’s life. This is at least the declared
objective of the new French disability policy, which intends to compensate for disability on the basis
of a personal “life-project”. The norm has become more abstract: it is no longer a case of conducting
oneself in the manner required by institutions; individuals are now being tasked with developing the
norm for their own conduct. But the construction of one’s sense of self and of one’s pathway, through
the reﬂexive work of épreuves, requires material and symbolic resources which are inequitably shared
out. To put it differently, any subjectivation process is by its very essence a social one. If we ignore it,
we run the risk of holding individuals responsible for their failures, due to the insufﬁciency of their
projects or to their inability to constitute themselves as the subject of the épreuve.
23 It should nevertheless be noted that when examined on the scale of the general population, these phenomena of “épreuve
reversal” are not accessible to everyone and their distribution reﬂects traditional social inequalities (Ville and Rufﬁn, 2006).
24 I am borrowing this term from Janine Pierret who uses it in her typology of the life pathways of people infected with HIV
(Pierret, 2006).
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These recent evolutions are of interest to social science researchers in asmuch as they reﬂect one of
the characteristics of modern reﬂexivity, the “dual hermeneutic” which links sociology to its subject:
on the one hand, “the development of sociological knowledge is parasitical upon lay agents’ concepts;
on the other hand, notions coined in the metalanguages of the social sciences routinely re-enter the
universe of actions they were initially formulated to describe or account for. But it does not lead in a
direct way to a transparent social world. Sociological knowledge spirals in and out of the universe of
social life, reconstructing both itself and that universe as an integral part of that process.” (Giddens,
1990, pp. 15–16).
Recent disability policy in France might be proof of a new stage in this reﬂexive process between
sociological knowledge and social practices. Returning to the principle of the construction of the sub-
ject through épreuves, it aims tomeetpeople’s aspirations and toallowthemtoachieve their objectives.
But this determination comes up against themanagerial constraintswhichweigh evermore heavily on
social action professionals and procedures (Chauvière, 2007), demonstrating that in this area, as in the
other areas of “work on the other” – education and hospitals – the ethical and vocational model gives
way to a model of instrumental rationality which is based on effectiveness and proﬁtability (Dubet,
2002).
We might therefore wonder if the removal of the meaning of disability as an “épreuve of the self”
from associative frontiers, along with its large publicisation (in which contemporary sociologists have
taken part), does not carry with it the risk of cancelling out the emancipation that it initially allowed.
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